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China Import Watch

China's crude buying: import volumes, sourcing shifts, teapot run rates, and what it means for sour barrel demand.

Read this page as the buy side of the sour barrel: China's import volumes and refinery runs decide how much sour crude Asia pulls, and the stock math (imports plus domestic production minus throughput) shows whether Beijing is building inventories or drawing them. Every bullet carries its vintage, so read 2026 wartime figures against pre-war baselines rather than against last week alone.

China is the world's largest crude importer and the marginal buyer of the sour barrels Western Canadian Select (WCS) competes against, so its buying sets the demand floor under the sour complex. When Chinese teapot refineries pull hard on Russian Urals and Iranian barrels, or Beijing restocks its strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), sour grades firm and Canadian heavies hold their differential; when China draws stocks instead, sour supply backs up and the WCS basis softens. Watch the Kayrros satellite inventory reads and the monthly refinery throughput numbers for the earliest signal of a buying turn.

Updated September 24, 2026 · refreshes every 14 days

Import volumes

• Reuters columnist Clyde Russell's analysis of official data (published Sep 15, 2026) showed China processed 13.91 million b/d in August, the most since March, against 8.93 million b/d of imports plus 4.34 million b/d of domestic production, implying a 640,000 b/d inventory draw. It was the third draw in four months (draws of 500,000 b/d in May and 940,000 b/d in June, a 210,000 b/d surplus in July); stocks are estimated at at least 1.2 billion barrels, and January to August still showed a net surplus of 330,000 b/d.
  Data: Aug 2026; published Sep 15, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 BOE Report (Reuters columnist Clyde Russell)
• Kpler data cited by Maritime Professional (Sep 23, 2026) put Asia on course to import 23.96 million b/d of crude in September, up from 23.38 million in August and the highest since February, extending the recovery from April's decade-plus low. Even so, September remained 13% below the 27.55 million b/d three-month pre-conflict average through February.
  Prelim data: Sep 2026; published Sep 23, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Maritime Professional (citing Kpler)

Sourcing shifts

• Saudi Aramco cut its September official selling price (OSP) for Arab Light to Asia by 50 cents a barrel to a $2/bbl discount against the regional benchmark, the fifth-lowest differential since 2000, per Energies Media (Aug 19, 2026). The cut reflected war-driven costs (freight, rerouting) plus formal discount requests from Asian refiners for longer voyages; Aramco held exports near 5 million b/d, about 70% of normal, leaning on Red Sea port Yanbu and potentially Sidi Kerir loadings.
  Reported Aug 19, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Energies Media
• Saudi Arabia left its October-loading Arab Light official selling price (OSP) to Asia unchanged, according to Reuters reporting via TradingView on Sep 3, 2026, pausing the easing that had taken the September price to a $2/bbl discount against the regional benchmark.
  Announced Sep 3, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 TradingView (citing Reuters)

Product exports

• Energy News Beat (Sep 13, 2026) reported the second batch of 2026 clean-product export quotas brought China's total 2026 allocation to about 32 million tonnes. August product exports hit 6.01 million tonnes, up 12.7% year on year, but January to August exports were still down 9.6% year on year, with gasoline down 57% year to date, consistent with a policy-managed surplus rather than an unconstrained export boom.
  Published ~Sep 13, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Energy News Beat
• General Administration of Customs (GAC) data reported by IDNFinancials (Sep 18, 2026) gave August per-fuel detail: gasoline exports 700,000 tonnes, down 17.5% year on year but the highest since October 2025; diesel 1.33 million tonnes, up 42.1% year on year and the highest since March 2024; jet fuel a record 2.55 million tonnes, up 41.4% year on year. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports fell 17.8% year on year to 5.16 million tonnes.
  Data: Aug 2026; reported Sep 18, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 IDNFinancials (citing Reuters/GAC data)
• Baird Maritime (Sep 21, 2026, citing GAC customs data) reported China's August fuel oil exports fell to 1.21 million tonnes (about 247,000 b/d), down 35% month on month and 27% year on year, the lowest since October 2024, partly on weather disruption at the Zhoushan bunkering hub. Fuel oil imports were 1.3 million tonnes, up 15% month on month and down 11% year on year; crude throughput climbed for a second month, supported by stronger fuel exports after Beijing eased export restrictions in mid-July.
  Data: Aug 2026; published Sep 21, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Baird Maritime (citing GAC customs data)

Freight and landed cost

• Tide Signal News (Sep 23, 2026, citing Reuters/Baltic Exchange data) reported very large crude carrier (VLCC) freight from the Gulf of Oman to China hit Worldscale 450, about $11.50 per barrel, a record for the route and up roughly 65% from the Sep 4 TD34 assessment, as conflict risk shrank the pool of tankers willing to trade around the Gulf.
  Data: Sep 11, 2026; published Sep 23, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Tide Signal News (citing Reuters/Baltic Exchange)
• Vessel Hunter News (Sep 22, 2026, citing Baltic Exchange data) reported the TD3C Middle East Gulf to China very large crude carrier (VLCC) time-charter equivalent reached $1.2125 million a day on Sep 17, up 40.6% on the week and roughly ten times the $117,400 a day before the February conflict. TD15 West Africa to Far East hit $524,500 a day and TD22 US Gulf to Far East $388,400 a day; the China Crude Oil Tanker Freight Index stood at 14,575 points on Sep 16, about 83% above its early-September level.
  Data: Sep 16-17, 2026; published ~Sep 22, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Vessel Hunter News (citing Baltic Exchange data)

Demand signals

• The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air's August 2026 snapshot (published Sep 17, 2026) found refinery throughput down 6.9% year on year in August, though recovered from July's slump. New energy vehicle (NEV) output rose 21.9% year on year to 61% of all vehicles produced, and battery production surged 70% year on year, consistent with continued structural gasoline displacement.
  Data: Aug 2026; published Sep 17, 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air

Strategic inventories

• The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), in analysis published April 2026, classifies China's strategic oil inventories at an estimated 1.397 billion barrels, comprising about 360 million barrels government-held and 1 billion barrels commercial. The EIA treats both as strategic because China's national oil companies have reportedly been instructed since 2024 to hold emergency oil in commercial tanks.
  EIA analysis: Apr 2026; accessed 2026-09-24 US Energy Information Administration (EIA)
• Geospatial firm Kayrros, via MEXC reporting from the Asia Pacific Petroleum Conference (APPEC) in Singapore, estimated China's strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) at about 415 million barrels and commercial stocks at about 780 million barrels in early September 2026, up close to 130 million barrels combined since late March, with above-ground capacity use near 60.5%, leaving room for further builds.
  Estimate: early Sep 2026; reported from APPEC; accessed 2026-09-24 MEXC (citing Kayrros chief analyst Antoine Halff at APPEC)

Where sources disagree

• Size of China's oil stockpile: US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Apr 2026 vs Kayrros via APPEC reporting (MEXC), early Sep 2026. The EIA classified China's strategic oil inventories at an estimated 1.397 billion barrels, about 360 million government-held and 1 billion commercial, while Kayrros estimated about 415 million in the strategic petroleum reserve plus about 780 million commercial, roughly 1.2 billion combined. Different observation dates and different definitions: the EIA counts national oil company commercial tanks as strategic by policy instruction, Kayrros measures by satellite, and Kayrros reported a build of nearly 130 million barrels since late March.

For the WCSB book, China matters through the sour barrel, not through direct Canadian sales. Strong Chinese runs and restocking bid up the grades Mars and Urals price against, which keeps the Canadian differential tight; a stock draw and a buying pause do the opposite. The teapot substitution story, Urals and fuel oil standing in for blocked Iranian barrels, is the near-term variable to watch.

Standing watch

What the daily feed updates on this page.

• Monthly GAC customs crude import volumes and y/y comparisons
• Kpler/Vortexa preliminary seaborne arrival estimates mid-month
• Russian, Iraqi, Saudi and Iranian shipment splits into China
• ESPO and Urals spot premiums to Brent
• Shandong teapot utilization (Mysteel/JLC/Oilchem) and inventory draws
• China's refined product export quotas and monthly export volumes
• IEA OMR Asia demand revisions
• Baltic Exchange very large crude carrier (VLCC) assessments (TD3C Middle East Gulf to China, TD34 Gulf of Oman to China) and the China Crude Oil Tanker Freight Index as landed-cost inputs.
• Kayrros/EIA China inventory estimates alongside monthly National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) refinery throughput to reconcile implied stock changes with Kpler/Vortexa onshore series.

Gaps

• No single authoritative public series for China's SPR (strategic) inventory changes, estimates rely on satellite/stock-model data.
• Current (September 2026) teapot run rates rely on consultancy surveys (Mysteel, JLC, Oilchem) rather than official NBS data, which lags.
• Vintage of the exact Russian ESPO/Urals spot premiums could not be fully reconciled across sources; treat as reported.
• Whether China's fuel export controls will tighten or loosen further after September is not verifiable.
• Whether Beijing issues a third batch of 2026 crude import quotas for independent refiners in Q4, and how much of the 257Mt annual allocation remains unreleased.
• No public time series for tank fill levels at new strategic reserve sites; satellite estimates (Kayrros) remain the only near-real-time read, and government vs commercial split is an EIA assumption, not disclosed data.
• Aramco's November 2026 official selling prices to Asia (expected around Oct 5) will set the trend for Iranian, Kuwaiti and Iraqi differentials into Q4; direction not verifiable until release.

Sources